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Abstract  
Are welfare state reforms electorally dangerous for governments? Only recently have political 
scientists begun to study this seemingly simple question, and existing work still suffers from two 
shortcomings. First, it has never tested the reform-vote link with data on actual legislative 
decisions for enough points in time to allow robust statistical tests. Second, it has failed to take 
into account the many expansionary reforms that have occurred in recent decades. Expansions 
often happen in the same years as cutbacks. By focusing only on cutbacks, estimates of the 
effects of reforms on government popularity become biased. In this paper, we address both 
shortcomings. Our results show that voters punish governments for cutbacks, but also reward 
them for expansions, making so-called “compensation” a viable blame avoidance strategy. We 
also find that the size of punishments and rewards are roughly the same, suggesting that voters’ 
well-documented negativity bias does not directly translate into electoral behavior.  
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The welfare state is among the most salient topics in West European electoral politics.1 Large 
segments of the public enjoy the benefits the welfare state brings, and it is something of a truism 
that governments can get seriously hurt by trimming citizens’ social rights.2 There is certainly 
plenty of anecdotal evidence of such electoral punishment, but the findings from more systematic 
research have been mixed. Indeed, existing research has found that welfare state cutbacks do 
sometimes, but not always, or only in specific contexts, lead to electoral punishment.3 
 However, given how controversial this consensus is – that most politicians most of the 
time can get away with cutbacks of the otherwise very popular welfare state – it is warranted to 
point to two weaknesses of extant research. First, the extant measures of welfare state reform are 
either too aggregated, indirect, or only applicable to a few cases. None of the existing 
measurements combines the qualities of recording concrete legislative changes with a large 
number of years and countries. Second, virtually no study has yet considered the effect of welfare 
state expansion. A significant amount of expansion has occurred even in the era of so-called 
permanent austerity since the 1970s, and such expansionist events can easily take place in the 
same election period as cutbacks. Moreover, we do not know if the effects of expansions and 
cutbacks are of the same magnitude, or if, as some research would suggest, cutbacks matter more 
to voters than expansions.4 In short, to get an unbiased estimate of the effect of changes in the 
welfare state on governments’ support from voters, both expansions and cutbacks have to be 
analyzed.  
 In this article we address both shortcomings. We collect a new dataset on welfare state 
reforms in pensions and unemployment protection combined with polling data for government 
support in Britain and Denmark, covering the years 1946-2014 in the former case and 1957-2014 
                                                 
1 e.g., Aardal and van Wijnen 2006. 
2 Pierson 1994; 1996. 
3 e.g., Giger 2011; Giger and Nelson 2011; 2013; Arndt 2013; Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 2015. 
4 Weaver 1986; Pierson 1994; 1996. 
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in the latter. The two countries are different both in terms of political system and welfare state 
structure. The data allows us to get a firm understanding of both commonalities and national 
idiosyncrasies in the effect of welfare state reform on support for government. 
 Our analysis shows that welfare state reforms affect government support. More precisely, 
with the exception of unemployment benefits in Denmark, support for government tends to 
decline as a response to cutbacks and increases as a response to expansions. In years with no 
expansions, cutbacks have a clear-cut negative effect, but in years with both cutbacks and 
expansions the negative effect is either neutralized or reversed into a net positive effect. 
Providing a thorough test of Pierson’s “compensation” strategy, our finding provides an answer 
to the question of why governments are not always punished for cutbacks and, more broadly, 
whether there is room for politicians today to claim credit for pleasing voters.5 Indeed, our results 
suggest that the reason why the existing literature has found such comparably mixed results is 
that it has overlooked the fact that governments often successfully claim credit for expansions.  
We also show that governments typically do not lose more support from cutbacks than 
they gain from expansions. This flies in the face of common wisdom, which assumes that voters 
care more about what is done against them than what is done for them. As we highlight in our 
discussion, this does not disprove the notion of negativity bias, but rather suggests that voters’ 
psychological biases are not translated as directly into vote intention as previously assumed. 
 In the following section, we start by outlining the state of the art in research on the link 
between welfare reform and electoral support, pointing out its achievements and shortcomings. In 
the subsequent section we deduce three hypotheses to be tested in the remainder of the paper. We 
then present our original data on welfare reform and discuss our estimation strategy and the 
relevant issues. After presenting our findings we end the paper by discussing next steps for 
research in this field.  
                                                 
5 Pierson 1994. 
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1. State of the art 
There is little doubt that the welfare state is hugely popular. Large segments of the public believe 
that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure adequate living conditions for the old, sick, 
and jobless, and it has been repeatedly documented that there is broad-based demand for ever 
more money to be spent on these areas.6 All else equal, such popularity makes cutbacks 
electorally risky. In the 1990s, this insight fueled the literature on the new politics of the welfare 
state, most eloquently advocated by Pierson.7  
 According to Pierson, politicians are squeezed between the popular demand for welfare 
and the need for fiscal austerity. On the one hand, voters will punish governments for cutbacks. 
On the other hand, public budgets are overburdened, taxation already too high, and debt 
gradually mounting to unsustainable levels. In such a situation, politicians will primarily do 
nothing, hoping simultaneously not to upset their voters and that the economy will keep afloat 
until they themselves are out of office.  
 Yet the prediction that nothing will happen has not proven correct. New data on the 
development of citizens’ social rights since the 1970s have shown conclusively that the 
generosity of the welfare state has declined, especially when it comes to unemployment 
protection.8 Given the popularity of the welfare state, the expectation based on the new politics 
argument would be that governments should have experienced a severe electoral backlash. 
Surprisingly, this does not appear to have happened.  
 Armingeon and Giger’s pioneer study finds that welfare state cutbacks are not dangerous 
unless they are made into an issue in the preceding electoral campaign.9 Giger and Nelson and 
                                                 
6 e.g., Jæger 2011; Jensen 2014. 
7 1994; 1996. 
8 Korpi and Palme 2003; Scruggs et al. 2014. 
9 Armingeon and Giger 2008. 
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Schumacher et al. study the role of party families for punishment, and both conclude that there is 
no universal cutbacks-punishment function at work.10 Giger and Nelson find that religious 
(mostly Christian democratic) and liberal parties can gain votes from cutbacks, while there are no 
effects for other party families. Conversely, Schumacher et al. find that social democratic and 
Christian democratic parties lose votes. All three studies use data from the Comparative Welfare 
State Entitlements Database on the social rights of citizens.11 With this data, it is possible to 
relate changes in social rights within an election period to changes in vote share from one 
election to the next. The foremost advantage of the dataset is its wide coverage both temporally 
and cross-nationally, covering multiple countries over roughly 30 years from the 1970s to the 
early 2000s.12  
 The downside of this approach is the aggregated nature of changes and that the measure 
of social rights does not capture legislative decisions. First, all three studies rely on changes in 
the replacement rates for benefit recipients as their measure of cutbacks. Replacement rates are 
the percentage of the average production worker’s wage that the unemployed, sick, or pensioners 
receive in income benefits. Replacement rates are meant to measure the real value of benefits 
paid out to recipients. Using replacement rates as the measure of welfare reform, however, is 
problematic in several ways. For one, they may not capture all forms of salient cutbacks. 
Reductions in the duration of benefits, qualification period, contribution level, and so on are all 
ignored by design even though a majority of changes actually relate to these forms of cutbacks, 
as we will detail below.13 This implies that the punishment opportunities are substantially 
underestimated. 
                                                 
10 Giger and Nelson 2011; Schumacher et al. 2013. 
11 Scruggs et al. 2014. 
12 Recently, new data for the 2002-2011 period was added to the Comparative Welfare State Entitlements 
Database, but was not included in the studies reviewed here.  
13 See Clasen and Clegg 2007 for a detailed critique. 
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Second, replacement rates are not a function just of the benefits paid out to recipients, but 
also, and again by design, of the wage of the average production worker. If the average 
production worker’s wage increases, the replacement rates will by mathematical necessity 
decrease unless benefits increase simultaneously (since the denominator in the calculation of the 
percentage grows while the numerator stays the same). In other words, if the economy is doing 
well and wages are increasing, replacement rates will decline even without any political decision 
to cut benefits. This is doubly problematic because governments typically are rewarded for a 
good economy14 and there is no blameworthy government action to punish. For these reasons too, 
using replacement rates is likely to underestimate the effect of cutbacks on government support.  
Finally, the implementation of political decisions to change replacement rates does not 
always happen in the same electoral cycle as the decision occurs. Delays in implementation are, 
in fact, frequent. This is normally the case with regard to pensions, where changes are 
implemented several years, or even decades, down the road, and sometimes such delayed 
implementation also happens for changes in unemployment and sick pay benefits.15 This means 
that the current government might not be to blame for reductions in benefits that may have been 
decided decades ago. That might not stop voters from blaming the government anyway, of 
course, but still points to a problem of identifying the causes of governments’ popularity. In 
addition, many voters have poor insight into their benefits and how they change over time. Given 
this, it is often the parliamentary decision to make cuts that attracts negative attention rather than 
the implementation itself.16  
Armingeon and Giger, Giger and Nelson, Schumacher and colleagues and several other 
articles examine the effect of cutbacks on the government’s vote share at the next election.17 
                                                 
14 e.g., Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000. 
15 Pierson 1994; Green-Pedersen 2004. 
16 Pierson 1994. 
17 Armingeon and Giger 2008; Giger and Nelson 2011; Schumacher et al. 2013. 
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Exploring the punishment-reward mechanism through electoral vote choice is clearly a valid 
choice, as elections are the foremost venue for voters to attribute political responsibility. There is, 
in other words, nothing wrong with such a strategy in itself, but again it risks overlooking 
punishment. Voters may react at the time of a decision, but later events in the electoral cycle such 
as an improving economy may crowd out the initial negative reaction to cutbacks. Put differently, 
an insignificant association between cutbacks and election outcomes can be caused by two 
things: that voters did not react, or that they in fact did react, but later events watered-down the 
effect. Whether or not that reaction carries over into the actual election outcome is clearly also 
important, but remains secondary to the more fundamental question: do voters even respond? Of 
course, the answer to this question is less interesting if the reaction only last for, say, one week. 
Yet if punishments last into the medium term, for instance one year, this must be considered 
substantial because it is likely to affect the way the government will behave (e.g., not proposing 
new cutbacks, launching initiatives in other policy domains to distract voters, or reshuffling the 
members of the cabinet).  
Another set of empirical studies focuses on a smaller number of cases using micro-level 
data.18 This allows researchers to link concrete legislative action with the reactions of voters, 
creating a fine-grained picture of the relationship between cutbacks and government popularity. 
These studies conclude that voters’ reaction is dependent on the context of the decision: 
sometimes governments are punished, but sometimes not. The downside of this small-N 
approach is that it is difficult to establish whether there are any general, or average, effects of 
cutbacks. More critically, with a small number of cases it is never possible to rule out potential 
confounders such as the state of the economy or how long the government has been in office (i.e., 
the so-called “cost of ruling” effect).  
                                                 
18 e.g., Arndt 2013; Davidson and Marx 2013; Lindbom 2014; Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 2015. 
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A commonality of virtually all existing studies is that they look at cutbacks only. This 
draws on what Pierson in his landmark work highlighted as the core issue of modern-day welfare 
state politics. Decades ago, in the Golden Age of the welfare state, expansion was the name of 
the game, but since the late 1970s, the need for fiscal austerity has ruled out expansions. Policy 
change, according to the literature, almost always equals cutbacks. Politicians can consequently 
never claim credit for popular actions (thereby winning new votes), and hope only to avoid blame 
for unpopular ones (hoping not to lose the votes they already have).  
However, as we will show below, expansions continue to occur almost with the same 
frequency as cutbacks, at least outside the area of unemployment protection. This is vital for 
several reasons. First, in substantive terms it means that there are many credit-claiming 
opportunities unaccounted for. A few existing studies suggest that governments under certain 
conditions can gain votes from cutbacks.19 Yet the much more obvious credit-claiming 
opportunity – expanding the generosity of social rights – has never been considered. Second, 
from a methodological perspective, by not including the (many) instances of expansion, the 
explanatory variable (welfare reform) is truncated to a subset of real-life observations. 20 Third, in 
years with cutbacks there may or may not also be expansion, and vice versa. Even if we assume 
that expansion does not have quite as strong a positive effect on government support as the 
negative effect of cutbacks, as long as expansion has any effect on government support, the 
statistical models not accounting for expansions are misspecified.  
Thus, despite substantial advances in the literature during the past decade, there are still 
some unsettled questions. To move the field forward we need data that fulfills five criteria. The 
data should (1) contain legislative decisions (2) relating to all aspects of welfare state generosity 
                                                 
19 Giger and Nelson 2011; Elmelund-Præstekær and Emmenegger 2013. 
20 The works of Armingeon and Giger, Giger and Nelson, Schumacher and colleagues, for instance, code 
cutbacks as “1” and status quo and expansions as “0”. When both status quo and expansion are coded 
together as “0”, years (or election cycles) without any reforms are treated as identical to years (or election 
cycles) with expansions, making it impossible to assess the independent effect of expansions. 
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and not just benefit levels, (3) include both cutbacks and expansions, (4) cover enough 
observations to control for possible confounders and (5) relate this to medium-term changes in 
government support. We present a dataset that meets these five criteria in Section 3. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The previous section hinted at a set of theoretical questions that have been glossed over, or not 
satisfactorily answered, because of the lack of appropriate data. Most basically, we still need to 
assert if cutbacks are punished by voters or not. Previous research has provided some insights, 
but given their methodological limitations a test of Pierson’s core proposition remains warranted. 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
 H1punishment: Government support declines after cutbacks.  
 
Apart from this baseline hypothesis, two issues that both relate to the potential for blame 
avoidance are of particular relevance.21 First, the fact that politicians not only cut in citizens’ 
welfare, but also expand it, raises the prospect that politicians can engage in a so-called “throw 
good money after bad” 22 or compensation23 blame avoidance strategy. Under this strategy, voters 
remain supportive of the government because they are getting an expansion to compensate for 
their loss. Although clearly not a very cost effective strategy, it can help politicians re-calibrate 
the welfare state without risking their own re-election. The electoral effect of such compensation 
has never been tested, which inspires the second hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
21 For reviews of the the literature on blame avoidance, see Hinterleitner 2015 and Vis 2016. 
22 Weaver 1986. 
23 Pierson 1994. 
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H2compensation: The loss in government support from cutbacks is reduced when cutbacks 
occur together with expansions. 
 
Second, one reason voters may not be persuaded by such compensation attempts, is the tendency 
for people to ascribe more importance to losses than to gains. Such negativity bias is well-known 
in psychology24 and has been suggested by both Weaver and Pierson to be present in the context 
of welfare reforms too.25 In this perspective, voters care more about what is done against them 
than what is done for them. If this is the case, an expansion should, in other words, matter less 
than a cutback for government popularity. Although this expectation certainly appears plausible, 
and to a large extent is regarded as common wisdom in the literature, it, too, has never been put 
to the test. Our third hypothesis therefore becomes: 
 
H3negativitiy bias: The losses in government support from cutbacks are bigger than the gains 
from expansions. 
 
In the rest of the paper we test these three hypotheses. We begin by accounting for our new 
dataset. 
 
3. A new dataset on welfare state reform in Britain and Denmark 
Our dataset contains information on legislative changes in the social rights of citizens with regard 
to old-age pensions and unemployment protection in Britain and Denmark. The two programs 
were selected for three reasons. First, they constitute a core part of what is conventionally 
understood as “the welfare state” and, as a result, are prominently featured in a very long list of 
                                                 
24 e.g. Rozin and Royzman 2001. 
25 Weaver 1986; Pierson 1994. 
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publications on the politics of the welfare state. They also form the backbone of the Comparative 
Welfare State Entitlement Database that Armingeon and Giger, Giger and Nelson, and 
Schumacher and colleagues, among others, rely on.26 Second, despite our general expectation 
about cutbacks and expansions hypothesized above, the effect of pension reform might be 
different from that of unemployment benefits. It is well-evidenced that social protection for the 
jobless is much less popular among the general public than social protection for the old and the 
sick.27 This suggests the possibility that voters’ reactions to welfare reforms might be slightly 
different depending on the domain of reforms. Third, both programs are transfer schemes, 
meaning that we can code them using the same codebook, which is important if we want to 
compare the two programs. Britain and Denmark were chosen because they are characterized by 
very different political systems.28 Britain is the prototypical Westminster system with normally 
just two large parties in Parliament and single party rule. Denmark, in contrast, is a multiparty 
system boasting minority governments.  
For the dataset we code all legislative changes (what we call reform events) relating to any of 
the following 13 aspects of citizens’ social rights: 
 
1. Qualification period: How long does it take for a person to become eligible?  
2. Contribution period: How long must a person contribute to a scheme before becoming 
eligible?  
3. Contribution level: How much must a person contribute?  
4. Waiting period: How long after a social risk occurs before a person is eligible?  
5. Age brackets: How old must a person be to be eligible?  
6. Means test: Is there a means test?  
7. Duration period: How long can a recipient receive benefits?  
8. Benefit level: Nominal value. What is the nominal value of the benefits? 
                                                 
26 Armingeon and Giger 2008; Giger and Nelson 2011; Schumacher et al. 2013. 
27 van Oorschot 2006; Jensen 2014; Jensen and Petersen 2017. 
28 Lijphart 1999. 
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9. Benefit level: Indexation rule. Are the nominal benefits automatically regulated and with 
what factor?  
10. Benefit level: Assessment base. Has the base for calculating benefits changed? 
11. Employability: Is the recipient required to or offered the opportunity to voluntarily 
participate in activities meant to increase the likelihood of getting a job?  
12. Health documentation: Is the recipient required to document that she is unable to work?  
13. Residence: Does it matter where and under what circumstances the recipient lives?  
 
For each of the 13 dimensions we identified whether the reform event implied a cutback or an 
expansion in citizens’ social rights. For example, in 1995 the British government reduced the 
maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits from one year to six months. This is 
coded as a cutback in the duration period (no. 7 in the list above). The same year, the British 
government increased the pension age for women from 60 to 65 years. This is coded as a cutback 
in social rights relating to age brackets (no. 5 in the list). We also coded whether a new scheme 
was created or abolished. There are not many of these events and the subsequent analyses are not 
affected by whether we include them alongside the regular reform events (i.e., assuming that the 
creation of a scheme is equivalent to an expansion of social rights and that the abolishment is 
equivalent to a cutback), or if we simply leave out this category of events. To gather information 
about reforms, we collected as many secondary sources as possible and supplemented these 
searches in legislative databases when necessary.29  
Figures 1-4 display the reform events of the two programs in Britain and Denmark. As we 
explain below, we were able to obtain data on government popularity back to 1946 in Britain and 
1957 in Denmark, so these years also mark the beginning of our reform event data. Figure 1 
                                                 
29 The coding was conducted by a team of trained research assistants and all coding decisions were 
subsequently controlled by a senior researcher. In the event the senior researcher did not agree with the 
original coding, the relevant research assistant and senior researcher discussed the coding decision in 
detail to reach agreement; however, there were only a small number of such instances. Further details 
regarding the coding scheme and data sources are found in Online Appendix B.  
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shows British unemployment protection with the number of reform events listed on the vertical 
axis on the left-hand side. The values on the y-axis represent the number of reform events: the 
number of expansions above the zero and the number of cutbacks below the zero line. The solid 
line tracks the development of expansionist reform events over time, while the dashed line tracks 
the development in reductions.  
 
Figure 1. Reform events in unemployment protection in Britain 1946-2014 
Note: The black circles with the solid line connecting them represent expansionist reform events. The hollow circles 
with the dashed line represent reductions. The number of reform events is reported on the vertical axis. The thin 
vertical dashed lines (i.e., in 1945, 1951, 1955, and so on) represent election years.  
 
There are several things worth noting in Figure 1. First, in the first roughly 20 years, only 
expansion takes place. For instance, in 1946 the National Insurance Act and the Industrial 
Injuries Act were both established (yielding the count of two expansion events in that year); in 
1948 the National Assistance Act was passed (a count of one); in 1953 the maximum period one 
could receive unemployment benefits was extended from 6 to 19 months (again a count of one); 
and so on. Second, the transformative nature of the Thatcher era is clearly visible. As many other 
researchers have pointed out before, since 1979 the generosity of British unemployment benefits 
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has been systematically cut. Third, the role of the incumbent’s ideology is also clearly visible. All 
the major instances of cutbacks have occurred under Conservative rule in 1980, 1986, 1988, 
1995, 2011 and 2012.  
 
Figure 2. Reform events in old-age pensions in Britain 1946-2014 
Note: See Figure 1 for details. 
 
 Moving from unemployment protection to old-age pensions, Figure 2 reveals important 
differences. In the first 30 years or so, the picture is much the same as for unemployment 
protection; namely just a few, mostly expansionist, events. From the 1970s reform activities build 
up. While the tendency towards cutbacks was obvious for unemployment, it was much more 
mixed for pensions. Most notable are the expansions under the Labour governments from 1997 to 
2010, but expansionist reforms took place from time to time under all governments since the 
1970s. This picture of a balance between expansions and reductions fits well with what we know 
about the development of their generosity from other sources. According to the Comparative 
Welfare State Entitlements Database, for instance, the overall generosity of old-age pensions has 
not declined since the 1970s – in marked contrast to unemployment generosity.30  
                                                 
30 Scruggs et al. 2014. 
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Figure 3. Reform events in unemployment protection in Denmark 1957-2014 
Note: See Figure 1 for details. 
 
Figure 4. Reform events in old-age pensions in Denmark 1957-2014 
 
Note: See Figure 1 for details. 
 
 Figures 3 and 4 display the data for Denmark. In Figure 3 the reform events in 
unemployment protection exhibit a pattern similar to the British. All reform events that occurred 
until the 1970s were expansions, at which point began a shift towards a new regime of cutbacks. 
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In contrast to the British case, however, both left- and the right-wing governments introduced 
cutbacks, although it is worth noting that many of the cutbacks under the right-wing governments 
of the 2000s were aimed at labor market outsiders and immigrants rather than native Danes.31  
In Figure 4 we once again see how old-age pensions have developed very differently. The 
last couple of decades have seen some cutbacks – in 1998, 2006, and 2011 in particular – but 
there have been many expansions as well. In 2004, for example, the means test for the pension 
supplement was relaxed, the so-called ældrecheck (literally “elder check”; an income 
supplement) made more generous, and a heat supplement was also made increased, while 
mandatory contributions to a special pensions fund were suspended.  
 In summary, Figures 1-4 reveal that there have been plenty of credit-claiming 
opportunities in both Britain and Denmark, even in the era of fiscal austerity where supposedly 
only cutbacks should have been on the table (although there have been many of those too). We 
use the number of cutback and expansion reform events as our main explanatory variable to 
examine how welfare reforms influence government support.32  
 
4. Data, measurements, and estimation strategy  
To examine whether the reform events have had any impact on government popularity, we 
compiled opinion polls that asked voters who they would vote for if there were an election 
tomorrow. The annual mean of the polling results for party/parties in government is our main 
dependent variable, the support for the government.33 The annually structured dataset allows us 
                                                 
31 See Arndt 2016. 
32 Some readers might raise a question about the validity of the measurement, such that: Does the number 
of reform events reflect the magnitude of welfare reforms? We have documented the relevant discussion 
and additional analyses for the validity check in Online Appendix C. 
33 We obtained monthly polling data from Gallup (1943-2001) and YouGov (2001-2014) for the UK, and 
from Politisk Indeks (1957-2011) and Søren Risbjerg Thomsen’s data (2012-2015) for Denmark. While 
we use the annual mean of support for governing parties as the main dependent variable, we also tested 
the hypotheses using slightly different ways of aggregation: by taking median value and midpoint value of 
monthly polling results. The robustness tests are reported in Online Appendix D. 
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to see if a reform event in any given year had an effect on the support for the government in the 
following year. A year is, as the saying goes, a long time in politics and if the effect persists for 
that long, it should be regarded as substantial – especially, of course, if the size of the effect is 
large.  
Figure 5 displays the support for British governments in the period under study. The 
black circles with solid lines represent the support for governments led by Labour and the hollow 
circles with dashed lines by the Conservatives. Apart from the well-known fact that British 
governments rarely have a majority of the voters behind them, it also transpires that the cost of 
ruling is at work. As a general tendency, governments loose popularity as time goes by, although 
they can bounce back, as Thatcher did from her low in 1982 (because of the Falklands war). 
Figure 6 shows the popularity of the Danish governments as the sum of the average support for 
the parties that comprised them. That Denmark tends to be run by minority governments is easy 
to detect, as is the cost of ruling, which, if anything, is even more evident here than in Britain.  
 
Figure 5. Government support in Britain 1946-2014 
Note: The vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents saying that they would vote for the government if there 
were an election tomorrow. The thin, dashed vertical lines are election years. Black circles with solid lines represent 
Labour governments. Hollow circles with dashed lines represent Conservative governments. 
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As our main interest is in the estimation of the effect of reform events on government 
popularity, our specification draws on the standard economic voting models that predict 
government popularity and party support.34 In so doing, we control for the variables that might 
affect both the reform events and government popularity. The economic situation is one such 
variable. There is a substantial body of research showing that a bad economy influences the 
likelihood of reforms occurring,35 but also that voters take the economic situation into account 
when deciding whether or not to vote for the incumbent.36 This suggests that the relationship 
between reform events and government support could be affected by the state of the economy. To 
control for this, we include measures of real GDP growth, the inflation rate, and the 
unemployment rate.  
 
Figure 6. Government support in Denmark 1957-2014 
Note: The vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents saying that they would vote for a party in the 
government if there were an election tomorrow. Legend indicates the party of the Prime Minister. A: Social 
Democratic Party, B: Social Liberal Party, V: Liberal Party, C: Conservative People’s Party. 
                                                 
34 e.g., Lewis-Beck et al. 2004; Sanders 2005; Yantek 1985. 
35 e.g., Amable et al. 2006; Jensen and Mortensen 2014. 
36 Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000. 
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 As noted before, governments tend to lose votes as time goes by. This is the well-
documented cost of ruling.37 There is also research suggesting that governments tend to enact 
cutbacks early in the electoral cycle to avoid punishment from voters.38 Taken together, we need 
to control for the number of years a government has been in office since this affects both the 
likelihood of reform and its popularity. For Denmark we also control for the number of parties in 
the cabinet. Work by Bawn and Rosenbluth suggests that governments with many parties tend to 
spend more than governments with fewer parties.39 Governments with more parties will, all else 
equal, also be bigger, which entails that we risk a biased estimate if we do not control for number 
of cabinet members.  
 Given the data structure we build, it is necessary to consider the temporal dynamics in the 
data. As for the reform events, Figures 1-4 demonstrate that the number of reform events in a 
given year is independent of the number of reform events in the year before. There is also no 
theoretical reason to expect that having or not having a reform in one year should matter for the 
likelihood of a reform in the following year. As for our dependent variable, there is a tendency 
for sliding popularity within each government, i.e., the cost of ruling. We handle this temporal 
trend in government support by including the cost of ruling as a control variable to de-trend the 
vote share within each government. Cost of ruling is coded as the number of years a given 
government was in office since the last election. In our analysis, this variable runs from 1 to 4 in 
Denmark and to 5 in the UK, the maximum legal length of an election term.40 We do not include 
                                                 
37 Nannestad and Paldam 1994. 
38 Pierson 1994. 
39 Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006. 
40 We have measured this variable in two different ways 1) by disaggregating the continuous variable 
“cost of ruling” into dummy variables that indicate the year since the government is elected, and 2) by 
generating two dummy variables for the first year and the second year of the government in order to 
indicate honeymoon period more directly. The results are reported in Table A3 in the Online Appendix A. 
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a lagged dependent variable in our regression models because the dependent variable does not 
share unit roots (i.e., the trend over the entire period is stationary, as can also be seen from 
Figures 5 and 6).41 The regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered around the 
different government parties.42 All independent variables except cost of ruling are lagged one 
year so we can see whether the effects of reforms persist into the medium term. With these 
methodological issues addressed, we now turn to the findings.  
 
5. Findings 
Table 1 reports the results for Britain. We estimate four models with Model 1 and 2 focusing on 
pension reforms and Model 3 and 4 on unemployment protection. Model 1 and 3 only contains 
the two main variables of interest, namely the number of expansion and cutback events. Model 2 
and 4 includes the controls. Since the consistent time series variables for the economy indices are 
only available since 1960, the full models cover years after 1960.  
 
  
                                                 
41 The Dickey-Fuller tests found no unit roots for 1- and 2-lags. Strictly speaking, our data are time-series 
within a party-government, but not for the entire period due to the existence of multiple cut points 
(discontinuity) in times of elections or government changes. For more on the risk of using lagged 
dependent variables for mixed models with longitudinal panel data, which we employ in this paper, see 
Keele and Kelly (2006).  
42 We clustered errors by the party of prime minister in Britain (Labour and Conservative party). For 
Denmark, the cluster is based on three types of coalition governments: Pure left-wing; a cooperation 
between a red and blue party (e.g. the Grand Coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the 
Liberal Party in 1978/79); or pure right-wing. We have replicated our main models including government 
ideology as a control variable. The results are reported in Table A1 in Online Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Welfare reforms and government support in Britain, 1946-2014 
 Pensions Unemployment 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Expansion 0.771 0.705+ 2.440** 2.286** 
  (0.517) (0.424) (0.696) (0.326) 
Cutbacks -1.985** -1.211** -1.280** -0.584** 
  (0.097) (0.389) (0.050) (0.170) 
Cost of ruling  -1.542**  -1.485** 
   (0.027)  (0.162) 
Real GDP growth  0.553*  0.540** 
   (0.247)  (0.171) 
Inflation  0.174**  0.153** 
   (0.009)  (0.011) 
Unemployment rate  -0.470**  -0.494+ 
   (0.087)  (0.292) 
Constant 39.069** 41.445** 39.044** 41.401** 
  (1.011) (0.554) (0.288) (1.314) 
Observations 68 53 68 53 
R2 0.101 0.304 0.130 0.307 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01. All variables lagged one year except for cost of 
ruling. 
 
Overall, the four models indicate relatively strong voter reactions to reforms. Although 
expansions of pensions are not significantly associated with government’s popularity in Model 1, 
the association turns significant in Model 2 at p<0.10 level after controlling for the cost of ruling, 
real GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rate. The estimated coefficient suggests that one 
expansion increases government support with 0.7 percentage points, which is a sizeable effect – 
also given that many years see more than one expansion event. Moving to the domain of 
unemployment protection, the positive effect of an expansion is even larger, though it should be 
stressed that there are not many expansions overall in unemployment protection (cf. Figure 1). 
The results indicate that a single positive reform event leads to a 2.5-2.8 percentage point 
increase in government popularity, suggesting that there is ample opportunity for credit-claiming 
in both policy domains. 
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 The results indicate that the effect of cutbacks is, again, quite sizeable. Moreover, the 
effects of cutbacks are consistently significant and negative across both domains, as expected in 
H1. For pensions the effect in the full model (Model 2) is 1.2 percentage point loss per reform 
event, down from 1.9 percentage point in the stripped-down model (Model 1). For 
unemployment protection the estimated effects are more sensitive to the inclusion of controls, but 
a single reform still entails a 0.6 percentage point loss in government popularity in the full model 
(Model 4). This remains a quite consequential effect exactly because cutbacks in unemployment 
protection have happened more frequently than any of the other outcomes (cf. Figures 1 and 2). 
These findings lend support to H1: British voters do react to cutbacks.  
The full models that include control variables account for around a third of the variation 
in government support (Models 2 and 4), and the stripped-down models (Models 1 and 3) explain 
between 10 and 13 percent of the variation. Although many other factors might affect a 
government’s popularity, it is noteworthy that our measures of expansions and cutbacks 
themselves can explain around 10 percent of the variation in government support.  
As mentioned previously, one of the shortcomings of the existing literature is that it does 
not empirically take well into account both expansions and cutbacks even though both Weaver 
(1986) and Pierson (1994) emphasize that a potential blame avoidance strategy may be to “throw 
good money after bad” or “compensate” by counter-balancing a cutback with an expansion (as 
summarized in H2). The empirical problem, in other words, is not just that both cutbacks and 
expansions matter. As we have shown so far, it is that there is great variation across years 
whether the reform events are purely expansionary, only cutbacks, or both at the same time. 
Focusing exclusively on cutbacks, as the empirical literature has done, risks producing a biased 
estimate. To illustrate this, we have calculated the net effects of one and two cutbacks in a year, 
respectively, when zero, one, or two expansion events occurred in the same year. Some of these 
scenarios do not occur in the data, or only do so in very few instances, in which case we refrain 
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from calculating the marginal effects (and report an N/A instead). Thus, we report the estimated 
effects of reform events in Table 2 only for the scenarios that may be considered realistic. 
 
Table 2. Net effects of expansions and cutbacks in Britain  
  Expansion events 
  0 1 2 
  Pensions 
Cutback events 
0 (baseline) 0.705* 1.410* 
1 -1.211** -0.506 0.199 
2 -2.421** -1.716 N/A 
 Unemployment 
0 (baseline) 2.286** 4.570** 
1 -0.584** 1.701** 3.987** 
2 -1.169** 1.117** 3.403** 
Note: Calculated based on the full models in Table 1 (Models 2 and 4). Net effects marked with ** statistically 
significant with p<0.05, and * with p<0.10. N/A means that the coefficient is not reported because the scenario does 
not occur in our data. 
 
 
In the left-most column the effect of cutbacks with no counter-balancing expansions is 
reported. Across the two policy areas (pensions and unemployment) and the number of cutbacks 
(one or two) there is a clear-cut negative effect of cutbacks on governments’ support. The 
negative effect varies in size across the policy areas as we would expect from the results in Table 
1, but in all cases the coefficient is non-negligible and statistically significant. Yet when there is 
just a single expansion event, the results alter dramatically. Looking first at pensions, a single 
expansion entirely neutralizes the effect of a cutback. The compensation effect is more 
pronounced for unemployment. A single expansion event even overpowers the effect of single 
cutback and neutralizes that of two cutbacks. The British data clearly supports our expectation, 
summarized as H2, that expansion events compensate the loss due to cutbacks.43  
 
                                                 
43 We did run additional models that interacted expansions with cutbacks. These did not substantially 
change the explained variance of the models and the predicted values for government support in the 
multiplicative specifications did not differ much from the linear additive models presented here. We 
therefore decided to go with the more parsimonious specification without an interaction.  
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Table 3. Welfare reforms and government support in Denmark, 1957-2014 
 Pensions Unemployment 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Expansions 0.788+ 0.889* -0.181 -0.622** 
  (0.421) (0.413) (0.614) (0.144) 
Cutbacks -0.467 -0.394* -0.438 -0.090 
  (0.779) (0.163) (0.690) (0.327) 
Cost of ruling  0.102  -0.553 
   (0.623)  (0.383) 
Real GDP growth  0.674**  0.705** 
   (0.169)  (0.083) 
Inflation  -0.017  -0.049 
   (0.574)  (0.601) 
Unemployment rate  -0.417  -0.588 
   (0.523)  (0.403) 
Number of cabinet parties  3.682**  3.834** 
   (1.270)  (1.219) 
Constant 36.686** 27.499** 38.717** 31.203** 
  (1.541) (1.984) (2.808) (1.718) 
Observations 53 49 53 49 
R2 0.044 0.447 0.022 0.410 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01. All variables lagged one year except for cost of 
ruling. 
 
Table 3 shifts attention to Denmark. Looking first at pensions, roughly the same picture 
emerges as for Britain. An expansion is rewarded with an increase in support of almost one 
percentage point in both Models 5 and 6. Cutbacks have a negative effect when controlling for 
confounders, but the size of the effect is a comparably low 0.4 percentage points, though still 
statistically significant and non-negligible in size. This gives a hint that blame diffusion is easier 
in the Danish political system since the support of Danish governments (usually minority) 
typically slips less than the support for British governments (always majority). Still, on balance 
the results from pension reforms in Denmark lend support to H1.  
Moving to unemployment protection, the results are rather interesting. In the stripped-
down model (Model 7) we find no significant effect of expansions or cutbacks. Yet when 
controlling for the confounders there is a negative effect of expansions (Model 8). This negative 
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effect of expansions is something of a puzzle. As noted above, it is well-known that 
unemployment protection is less popular with the public than old-age pensions, in Denmark as 
well as in Britain. However, the fact that Danish unemployment benefits and conditions are much 
more generous than the British might play a role. Unemployment benefits almost always go to a 
small and relatively marginal group, and if the Danish public believes that benefits are already 
high, a government’s attempt to expand them could be perceived as a waste of money. While this 
is not quite within the range of present study, whether the negative effect is driven by specific 
events is certainly a matter for future examination.  
 
Table 4. Net effects of expansions and cutbacks in pensions in Denmark 
  Expansion events 
  0 1 2 
  Pensions 
Cutback events 
1 -0.394** 0.495 1.383* 
2 -0.788** N/A N/A 
3 -1.183** N/A N/A 
Note: See Table 2 for details. 
 
Table 4 reports the net effects of reform events on government popularity, as Table 2 did 
for Britain. Since apparently only expansions matter in the domain of unemployment protection, 
and therefore there can be no counter-balancing effect, we compute the net effects only in the 
domain of pensions, for the cases with one to three cutbacks across scenarios with various 
numbers of expansions in pensions. Similar to the results we demonstrated for Britain, cutbacks 
with no expansions have a negative effect on support for governments in Denmark. This negative 
effect is neutralized by just one expansion event, and with more expansions governments get 
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even more support as long as there is only a single cutback.44 All in all, governments appear to be 
able to compensate by combining cuts with expansions (H2) both in Britain and Denmark. 
Following this, we can now turn to a more systematic assessment of the negativity bias 
hypothesis (H3): Do cutbacks lead to stronger reactions than expansions? To capture whether the 
effects of cutbacks are larger than the effects of expansions, Table 5 compares the magnitude of 
the coefficients employing a set of Wald tests, which are reported in the last column. Note that to 
zero-in on the magnitude, the analyses only compare the absolute values. In three out of four 
tests, the difference is insignificant, while expansions of British unemployment protection are 
rewarded more generously than cutbacks are punished. In the latter case, it should be kept in 
mind that there are few expansions of British unemployment protection to begin with. At any 
rate, our analysis suggests that voters are not particulary harsh in punishing cutbacks compared to 
rewarding for expansions. That is, the negativity bias hypothesis (H3) is not supported as the 
general response to welfare reforms in Britain and Denmark, at least.  
 
Table 5. Wald tests of negativity bias 
  Magnitude: Effect 
of cutbacks 
Magnitude: Effect of 
expansions 
Wald test 
Britain Pensions 1.211 0.705 Cut>Exp 
Unemployment  0.584 2.286 Cut<Exp** 
Denmark Pensions 0.394 0.889 Cut<Exp 
Unemployment  0.090 0.622 Cut<Exp 
                                                 
44 Given that Denmark has multiparty governments most of the time, it is an interesting question whether 
some parties in government are punished more or less than others. We have reproduced the pension 
models in Table 3 with support for the Prime Minister’s party, instead of all parties in the government, as 
the outcome variable (results are reported in Table A4 in Online Appendix). Overall, the results for the 
effect of expansions are substantially very similar (but with slightly smaller coefficients), but the negative 
effects of cutbacks are even more muted than when looking at support for the whole cabinet. Compared to 
the results from Britain, this result might partially suggest that the relatively lower clarity of responsibility 
in Danish coalition governments results in less clear punishment and reward to the Prime Minister’s 
parties. In particular, this also indicates that blame is not equally distributed (and that perhaps nor is 
credit). 
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Note: The Wald-test are based on the absolute values of the coefficients for cutbacks and expansion, based on 
Models 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Tables 1 and 3. The entries are the absolute size of the coefficients, e.g., the effects of 
cutbacks are originally all in negative value. **p<0.01. 
 
 Negativity bias is a well-established phenomenon in human psychology45 with 
documented ramifications in, for instance, media reporting.46 Given this, our findings are 
surprising and at odds with the expectations of Weaver and Pierson.47 So why do we not observe 
a negativity bias in voter reactions to reforms? One reason may be that voters do not evaluate 
reforms the same way they evaluate other phenomena, although this appears implausible given 
the pervasiveness of negativity biases in human psychology. More likely, there is something 
about the way in which cutbacks and expansions are implemented that dilute voters’ negativity 
bias. Both Weaver and Pierson, in fact, point in this direction. Re-election motivated politicians 
may introduce cutbacks using technical, or “invisible”, policy instruments thereby hiding the 
extent of the cuts (or whether there were any at all). Conversely, expansion may be introduced 
using less technical, of “visible”, policy instruments. This would allow the politicians to 
maximize credit-claiming for expansions and minimize blame for cutbacks. If we assume that 
voters actually punish cutbacks harder than expansions and reforms are implemented in this way, 
this could explain the observed pattern.48 
  
6. Discussion 
Given that the welfare state is hugely popular among voters, the findings in recent studies that 
governments can frequently get away with cutbacks have puzzled many researchers. There can 
be several reasonable explanations for this phenomenon: Voters may give priority to issues other 
                                                 
45 e.g. Rozin and Royzman 2001. 
46 Soroka 2006. 
47 Weaver 1986; Pierson 1994. 
48 For evidence pointing in this direction, see Jensen et al. 2017. 
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than welfare policy reforms; they might not have a thorough understanding of what goes on in 
politics; or they might simply be unaware of reforms.49 Undoubtedly there is much truth in these 
descriptions of voters, but our aggregate-level analysis suggests that they do not tell the whole 
story. 
 First, using a more appropriate measure of welfare reforms, which assuages concerns 
about the measurements previously employed in the literature, we have located substantially 
sizable effects of cutbacks on government support. Second, we have also shown that expansions 
can have fairly considerable positive effects. Binding together the two findings, the net effect of 
reform events on government popularity can vary greatly depending on whether a given year sees 
only cutbacks, only expansions, or both at the same time. This suggests that much of the previous 
literature suffers from a misspecification problem. More interestingly, though, it also suggests 
that modern-day politicians have more room for maneuver than is commonly assumed. Blame 
avoidance is not the only game in town. Instead, there is room for a government to please voters 
enough to make them support it. It seems that credit-claiming never left the stage entirely.  
 As is evident from Figures 1-4, there are many more cutbacks occurring today than three 
decades ago; something that is well-documented in the literature. This reflects that governments 
have been forced to restructure the welfare state to meet the demands of a globalizing economy. 
Yet there are fundamental differences across the two programs we studied in this paper. 
Unemployment insurance has witnessed many more cutbacks than pensions, which have seen 
just as many expansions as cutbacks. As mentioned above and elsewhere in the literature, this 
might be because pensions are much more popular than unemployment benefits. This difference 
in popularity is also plainly evident in our results. Controlling for potential confounders, electoral 
punishment for cutting back pensions in Britain is twice as large as the punishment for cutting 
                                                 
49 e.g., Pierson 1994; Giger and Armingeon 2008; Giger and Nelson 2013; Elmelund-Præstekær et al. 
2015. 
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back unemployment protection. In Denmark on average there is no punishment at all for cutbacks 
in unemployment protection, but a substantial one for cutting pensions.  
 By way of conclusion, let us point to three important questions for future research. First, 
how is it, more exactly, that voters come to know about welfare state reforms and subsequently 
decide to punish the government? Voters are presumably not keeping track of new legislation by 
themselves. Rather, they are likely to depend on mass media communication to stay informed 
about developments. Welfare reforms will, all else equal, be a salient issue to report on for most 
media, which is probably why we find the effects we do.50 Voters generally are well enough 
informed to react; yet sometimes they may not be so informed. Understanding when welfare 
reforms become media news is, in other words, important. 
 Second, we found that most of the time both expansions and cutbacks lead to reactions of 
the same magnitude. This flies in the face of claims that voters fail to react to expansions and 
only focus on cutbacks. That said, expansions and cutbacks may not be implemented the same 
way. Following the logic of Weaver and Pierson, it is possible to hypothesize that cuts will be 
introduced in more subtle ways than expansions to minimize blame from the former and 
maximize credit-claiming from the latter.51 An interesting avenue of future research would be to 
study the way expansions and cutbacks are introduced and whether that may help explain why 
there is no difference between of the effects of cutbacks and expansions. Third, we observed 
some cross-country differences between Britain and Denmark. With only two countries, it is hard 
                                                 
50 While it is beyond the scope of this study, we fully recognize the value of exploring when and how 
welfare reforms are reflected in media. The particular difficulty incorporating the media communication 
component into the current study is, to our best knowledge, the lack of fine-tuned codes focusing on the 
event of welfare reform legislation itself in the existing media dataset out there. Another important 
limitation is that existing news media archives do not cover the study period, which makes it impossible to 
incorporate the news coverage into our statistical model as a proxy of voter attention to reform events, 
e.g., Danish newspaper archive Infomedia only covers the main newspapers since 1990 and the largest 
newspaper ‘Jyllands-Posten’ only since 1996. Similarly, Lexis-Nexis and Retriever de facto only cover 
the years since 1996.  
51 Weaver 1986; Pierson 1994. 
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to ascribe much inferential value to such distinctions, but it is, of course, plausible that the 
institutional setup of these and other countries affect voters’ reactions. With a larger sample of 
countries, it may be possible to more systematically gauge such cross-country differences. Lastly, 
we have explored the effects of cutbacks on voter reactions on two policy areas. An ambitious 
next step would be to obtain data on more areas – not simply to see if similar effects there, but to 
explore how reforms on one area may compensate for reforms on another. 
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